

## Lecture Notes, Lectures 12 -13

### 5.1 Household Consumption Sets and Preferences

$H, i= 1, 2, \dots, \#H$

$i \in H, X^i \subseteq R_+^N, u^i: X^i \rightarrow R$  (fully represents  $\succsim_i$ ),  $r^i \in R_+^N$ ,

$1 \geq \alpha^{ij} \geq 0$  for each  $j \in F$ .

$x \in X^i, x=(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_N)$

#### Consumption Sets

(C.I)  $X^i$  is closed and nonempty.

(C.II)  $X^i \subseteq R_+^N$ .  $X^i$  is bounded below and unbounded above.

(C.III)  $X^i$  is convex.

$X^i$  may be  $R_+^N$ .

$$X = \sum_{i \in H} X^i .$$

## Preferences

$x, y \in X^i$ , " $x \succsim_i y$ " is read "x is preferred or indifferent to y (according to i)."

## Utility Function

Let  $u^h: X^h \rightarrow R$ . Then  $u^h$  is a utility function.

**Definition:** We will say that the utility function  $u^h(\bullet)$  represents the preference order  $\succsim_h$  if for all  $x, y \in X^h$ ,  $u^h(x) \geq u^h(y)$  if and only if  $x \succsim_h y$ . This implies that  $u^h(x) > u^h(y)$  if and only if  $x \succ_h y$  and not  $[y \succsim_h x]$ .

We will assume there is  $u^i: X^i \rightarrow \mathbf{R}$  so that  $u^i(\cdot)$  represents  $\succsim_i$ .

Read  $u^i(x) \geq u^i(y)$  wherever you see  $x \succsim_i y$ .

### Weak monotonicity

(C.IV) (Weak Monotonicity) Let  $x, y \in X^i$ , with  $x \gg y$ , (that is,  $x_i > y_i, i = 1, \dots, N$ ).  
Then  $u^i(x) > u^i(y)$ .

## Continuity

(C.V) (Continuity) For every  $x^o \in X^i$  the sets  
 $A^i(x^o) = \{x | x \in X^i, x \succsim_i x^o\}$  and  
 $G^i(x^o) = \{x | x \in X^i, x^o \succsim_i x\}$  are closed. That is, the  
inverse images of closed subsets of  $\mathbb{R}$  under  $u(\bullet)$  are closed.

Equivalently:  $u^i(\cdot)$  is a continuous function.

Continuity of  $u^i$  allows us to use Corollary 2.2. What does the continuity assumption rule out? Lexicographic preferences provide an example of discontinuous preferences (which cannot be represented by a utility function; certainly not by a continuous utility function).

**Example** (Lexicographic preferences):  $\succ_L$   $x = (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_N)$ ,  $y = (y_1, y_2, \dots, y_N)$ .

$x \succ_L y$  if  $x_1 > y_1$ , or

if  $x_1 = y_1$ , and  $x_2 > y_2$ , or

if  $x_1 = y_1$ , and  $x_2 = y_2$ , and  $x_3 > y_3$ , and so forth ....

$x \sim_L y$  if  $x = y$ .

## Strict Convexity of Preferences

(C.VII) (strict convexity of preferences):

$u^i(x) \geq u^i(y)$ ,  $x \neq y$ ,  $0 < \alpha < 1$ , implies

$u^i(\alpha x + (1-\alpha)y) > u^i(y)$ .

### 5.3 Choice and Boundedness of Budget Sets, $\tilde{B}^i(p)$

**Definition:**  $x$  is an attainable aggregate consumption if  $y + r \geq x \geq 0$  where  $y \in Y$  and  $r \in R_+^N$  is the economy's initial resource endowment, so that  $y$  is an attainable production plan. Note that the set of attainable consumptions is bounded under P.II, P.III, P.V, P.VI.

Choose  $c \in R_+$  so that  $|x| < c$  (a strict inequality) for all attainable consumptions  $x$ . Choose  $c$  sufficiently large that  $X^i \cap \{x \mid x \in R^N, c \geq |x|\} \neq \emptyset$ .

$\tilde{M}^i(p)$  represents  $i$ 's income as a function of  $p$ . We do not need precisely to specify  $\tilde{M}^i(p)$  at this point.

When we do, income will be characterized as the value of the household endowment plus the value of the household share of firm profits =  $p \cdot r^i + \sum_j \alpha^{ij} \tilde{\pi}^j(p)$  .

$$\tilde{B}^i(p) = \{x \mid x \in R^N, p \cdot x \leq \tilde{M}^i(p)\} \cap \{x \mid \|x\| \leq c\}.$$

$$\tilde{D}^i(p) \equiv \{x \mid x \in \tilde{B}^i(p) \cap X^i, x \text{ maximizes } u^i(y) \text{ for all } y \in \tilde{B}^i(p) \cap X^i\}$$

$$\tilde{D}(p) = \sum_{i \in H} \tilde{D}^i(p) .$$

**Lemma 5.1:**  $\tilde{B}^i(p)$  is a closed and bounded (compact) set.

**Lemma 5.2:** Let  $\tilde{M}^i(p)$  be homogeneous of degree 1. Then  $\tilde{B}^i(p)$  and  $\tilde{D}^i(p)$  are homogeneous of degree 0.

$$P \equiv \left\{ p \mid p \in \mathbb{R}^N, p_i \geq 0, i = 1, 2, 3, \dots, N, \sum_{i=1}^N p_i = 1 \right\}$$

## Positivity of Income

$$(C.VIII) \quad \tilde{M}^i(p) > \min_{x \in X^i \cap \{y \mid y \in \mathbb{R}^N, c \geq |y|\}} p \cdot x \geq 0 \text{ for all } p \in P .$$

**Example (The Arrow Corner):** This example demonstrates the importance of (C.VIII). (C.VIII) is not fulfilled in the example resulting in discontinuous demand.

$$X^i = \mathbb{R}_+^2$$

$$r^i = (1, 0)$$

$$\tilde{M}^i(p) = p \cdot r^i .$$



$$p^0 = (0, 1).$$

$$\tilde{B}^i(p^0) \cap X^i = \{(x, y) | c \geq x \geq 0, y = 0\}$$

$$p^v = \left(\frac{1}{v}, 1 - \frac{1}{v}\right). \quad p^v \rightarrow p^0.$$

$$\tilde{B}^i(p^v) \cap X^i = \left\{ (x, y) | p^v \cdot (x, y) \leq \frac{1}{v}, (x, y) \geq 0, c \geq |x| \geq 0 \right\}$$

$(c, 0) \in \tilde{B}^i(p^0)$  but there is no sequence

$(x^v, y^v) \in \tilde{B}^i(p^v)$  so that  $(x^v, y^v) \rightarrow (c, 0)$ .

For any sequence  $(x^v, y^v) \in \tilde{B}^i(p^v)$  so that

$(x^v, y^v) = \tilde{D}^i(p^v)$ ,  $(x^v, y^v)$  will converge to some  $(x^*, 0)$

where  $0 \leq x^* \leq 1$ . We may have  $(c, 0) = \tilde{D}^i(p^0)$ . Hence  $\tilde{D}^i(p)$  need not be continuous at  $p^0$ . This completes the example.

## 5.4 Demand behavior under strict convexity

**Theorem 5.2:** Assume C.I - C.V, C.VII, C.VIII. Let  $\tilde{M}^i(p)$  be a continuous function for all  $p \in P$ . Then  $\tilde{D}^i(p)$  is a well-defined, point-valued, continuous function for all  $p \in P$ .

**Proof:** Well defined: Compactness of  $\tilde{B}^i(p) \cap X^i$  and continuity of  $u^i(\cdot)$ .

Unique (point valued): Strict convexity of preferences, C.VII.

Continuous

C.VIII  $\Rightarrow \tilde{M}^i(p) > 0$  for all  $p \in P$ .

Let  $p^v \in P$ ,  $v = 1, 2, 3, \dots$ ,  $p^v \rightarrow p^o$ . Show  
 $\tilde{D}^i(p^v) \rightarrow \tilde{D}^i(p^o)$ .  $\tilde{D}^i(p^v)$  is a sequence in a compact set.

Without loss of generality take a convergent subsequence,  
 $\tilde{D}^i(p^v) \rightarrow x^o$ . We must show that  $x^o = \tilde{D}^i(p^o)$ . Proof by  
 contradiction.

Define  $\hat{x} = \arg \min_{x \in X^i \cap \{y | y \in R^N, c \geq |y|\}}$   $p^o \cdot x$ .

$p^o \cdot \tilde{D}^i(p^o) > p^o \cdot \hat{x}$  (by C.VIII).

Let  $\alpha^v = \min \left[ 1, \frac{\tilde{M}^i(p^v) - p^v \cdot \hat{x}}{p^v \cdot (\tilde{D}^i(p^o) - \hat{x})} \right]$ . For  $v$  large,  $\alpha^v$  is well

defined.  $0 \leq \alpha^v \leq 1$ .  $\alpha^v \rightarrow 1$ . Let  $w^v = (1 - \alpha^v) \hat{x} + \alpha^v \tilde{D}^i(p^o)$ .

$w^v \rightarrow \tilde{D}^i(p^o)$  and  $w^v \in \tilde{B}^i(p^v) \cap X^i$ . Suppose

$x^0 \neq \tilde{D}^i(p^0)$ . Then  $u^i(\tilde{D}^i(p^0)) > u^i(x^0)$ . But for  $v$  large,  
 $u^i(w^v) > u^i(\tilde{D}^i(p^v))$  by continuity of  $u^i$  and the convergence  
of  $w^v \rightarrow \tilde{D}^i(p^0)$ ,  $\tilde{D}^i(p^v) \rightarrow x^0$ . This is a contradiction, since  
 $\tilde{D}^i(p^v)$  maximizes  $u^i(\cdot)$  in  $\tilde{B}^i(p^v) \cap X^i$ . QED

**Lemma 5.3:** Assume C.I - C.V, C.VII, C.VIII. Then

$p \cdot \tilde{D}^i(p) \leq \tilde{M}^i(p)$ . Further, if  
 $p \cdot \tilde{D}^i(p) < \tilde{M}^i(p)$  then  $|\tilde{D}^i(p)| = c$ .

**Proof:** Budget or length is a binding constraint --- if not  
budget, then length.